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COSTS OF
CIGARETTES
The first criticism is that the proposed
resolution would not require
manufacturers and, in turn, consumers
to pay anything approaching the true
total costs of cigarettes, costs that we
estimate to be at least $ 7 per pack, a
number that is considerably higher than
other estimates that have been reported
in the media. Our estimate includes
some, but not all, of the costs borne
ultimately by smokers themselves, by
smokers' insurers, and by individuals
injured by second-hand smoke. It
includes only future costs and excludes
many of those. So, for example, the
figure includes neither the health-care
costs that have previously been caused
by smoking nor the future pain-andsuffering costs borne by smokers or
family members of deceased smokers.
Unlike most economists who have
previously attempted to measure the
costs of cigarettes, we do not reduce our
estimate of cigarette costs to take into
account the "savings" resulting from
cigarette-induced premature deaths.
Those savings - measured mostly in the
form of smokers' unclaimed pension and
nursing-home entitlements - may not
in fact be real, and in any event, are not
relevant to the questions of whether and
how best to regulate the market for
cigarettes.
We should make clear that the
purpose of the $7 per pack figure is not
to suggest that a tax of $7 per pack
should be imposed or that, following the
introduction of the sort of regulatory
regime we suggest below, cigarette prices
will rise by $7 per pack. Rather, it is
meant only to suggest the magnitude of
the need for some type of regulatory
intervention. In fact, under the smokers'
compensation regime that we
recommend , we would for a number of
reasons that we cannot pursue here
expect cigarette prices to rise by no more
than $3 per pack.
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IDENTIFYING

APPROPRIATE
REGULATORY
RESPONSE
The proposed resolution is implicitly
premised on the assumption that some
form of intervention in the cigarette
market is necessary In light of evidence
that smokers typically begin their habits
at a very early age, tend not to be well
informed of the long-term health risks of
smoking, often underestimate
addictiveness of cigarettes, and often do
not bear many of the costs associated
with smoking, we agree that the market
for cigarettes should not be left
unregulated. Our second criticism of the
proposed resolution, however, is that the
regulatory regime that it would
implement is almost exactly the inverse
of what it should be. To understand that
criticism, it is helpful to step back from
the proposal itself and ask a more general
question (a question that, curiously, has
evaded scholars and commentators to
this point): What is the best approach to
regulating cigarettes?

A. Three categories of regulation
Regulatory scholars have, in broad
terms, identified three general categories
of regulation: command-and-control
regulation; performance-based regulation;
and incentive-based regulation. The
distinctions we draw among the three
types of regulation are not perfect and
can, in some instances, begin to blur.
Thus, some examples of performancebased regulation begin to look like
incentive-based regulation. In fact, it is

probably most accurate to understand
the three categories of regulation as
demarcating three points along a
continuum, with command-and-control
regulation at one end, incentive-based
regulation at the other end, and
performance-based regulation
somewhere in between. Nevertheless, it
is useful to maintain the conceptual
distinctions among the three types of
regulation to enable us to identify the
costs and benefits of moving in one
direction or the other along the
continuum.
Under command-and-control
regulation, sometimes called "input
regulation," the regulator imposes
specific requirements on the firm. The
regulator in effect tells the regulated firm
how specifically to run some aspect of its
business. In regulating pollution, for
example, the command-and-control
regulator might prescribe specific steps
that manufacturers must take, or specific
technologies that they must use, in order
to reduce the level of pollution that is
emitted by their manufacturing
processes.
There are many examples of
command-and-control regulation in the
proposed resolution. For example, the
warning requirements and the
advertising restrictions that would be
imposed on manufacturers are best
characterized as command-and-control
regulations. Similarly, if the Food and
Drug Administration exercised its limited
authority under the proposed resolution
to mandate particular "technically
feasible," "less hazardous tobacco
products," it would do so in the form of
command-and-control regulations.
Under performance-based regulation,
by contrast, the regulator presents
manufacturers with a target of some sort,
which the manufacturers are encouraged
to meet. That target is sometimes called a
"performance standard." The
manufacturers are then left to decide

how best to achieve that target. One
performance standard, for example,
might be a maximum quantity of
pollution that a firm is allowed to emit
over a given period of time, such as that
allowed by tradeable pollution permits.
Failure to achieve the relevant target,
however, would result in a fine or
additional regulation. The proposed
resolution contains a couple of
performance-based standards. The best
known example is the so-called "lookback" provision, which would set target
levels of underage smoking that the
industry would pay a fine for failing
to meet.
Performance-based regulation, when
compared to command-and-control
regulation, reflects a greater degree of
humility and skepticism with regard to
how much the regulator can be expected
to know about the cutting-edge
technology in a given industry and a
greater degree of reliance on the industry
(or the market) to have and act on that
information. Nevertheless, both types of
regulation make substantial informational
demands on the regulator.
If there is a performance standard or
target that is assumed to be desirable,
performance-based regulation can be
superior to command-and-control
regulation as a means of achieving that
standard, for the reason already
described - manufacturers have better
information. In addition, if we know
what the target standard is, then
enforcement of such a standard is
relatively easy (because of the ease of
monitoring compliance) compared to
enforcement of command-and-control
regulation, where the regulator must
constantly defer to the informational
advantage of the manufacturer.
Although there is something to be
said for performance-based regulation
over command-and-control regulation,
it is our view that they both impose
roughly the same informational demands
on the regulator. Although we develop
that argument in considerable detail in
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our Article, the general idea is captured
in the following question: How is the
performance-based regulator supposed to
choose the appropriate target level of
performance (or the appropriate fine for
failing to meet that target)? For example,
how does Congress or EPA determine the
aggregate level of air or water pollution
to permit? To answer such questions the
regulator must have information about
not only the level of harm caused by
different levels of pollution but also the
total social costs and benefits of the
activities that give rise to the pollution.
Incentive-based regulation is superior
to command-and-control and
performance-based regulation inasmuch
as it requires less information of the
regulator, and it relies more on the
market to generate the desired regulatory
outcomes. Under incentive-based
regulation, the regulator simply forces
the manufacturers to pay the total costs
of their manufacturing activities. The
manufacturers are then left to decide
what to do about those costs, if anything.
Thus, incentive-based regulation does
not tell manufacturers how to run their
business (as command-and-control
regulation does). Nor does it require the
regulator to choose the ideal regulatory
target (as performance-based regulation
does). It simply makes the industry pay
its costs, and lets the market sort things
out. The general superiority of incentivebased regulation over command-andcontrol regulation in most settings is
fairly widely accepted among scholars
and is increasingly recognized by policy
makers. Indeed, most of the important
debates in environmental regulation
seem to be over, not whether to use
market forces, but how best to use
market forces as a means of reducing
pollution.
It is not our position that commandand-control and performance-based
regulation should never be used. There
are circumstances in which those types of
regulation may be useful supplements to
ex post incentive-based regulation. We
do take the position, however, that those
types of regulation, especially in the
cigarette context, are not viable substitutes
for ex post incentive-based regulation.
Still, those regulatory alternatives can
serve a complementary function. Even in
the cigarette context, for example, those
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forms of regulation might prove helpful
as a means of reducing underage
smoking. In addition, in some noncigarette situations (for example, in
dealing with the problems of air
pollution created by automobile
emissions), either command-and-control,
performance-based, or perhaps an excise
tax ("ex ante incentive-based regulation")
may be the only available options. This
would be true if ex post incentive-based
regulation (of the type we describe in
greater detail in the text below) were
considered impractical, perhaps because
the harms associated with generalized air
pollution are too widely dispersed to give
rise to ex post damage claims brought by
individual victims. It should be
emphasized, however, that the cigarette
market presents a setting in which ex
post incentive-based regulation is
available as a regulatory option.

B. The problem with the
proposed resolution
Given this consensus in favor of
incentive-based regulation, one would
hope that any proposal to regulate
cigarettes would rely most heavily on
incentive-based approaches, with little
emphasis on command-and-control and
performance-based regulation. In fact,
however, the proposed resolution takes
just the opposite approach. It is
dominated by a renewed and
strengthened emphasis on commandand-control regulation, including
everything from new warning
requirements to new FDA control over
the level of nicotine and other
ingredients in tobacco products. And the
proposed resolution is especially
remarkable for its lack of incentive-based
regulatory approaches. In fact, by sharply
curtailing products liability law as a
means of regulating manufacturer
behavior, the proposed resolution would
eliminate the only existing incentivebased system with any potential for
internalizing the external costs of
smoking.

C. The benefits of incentivebased regulation

In addition, the settlement contains
the occasional performance-based
approach - such as the "look back"
provision designed to achieve specific
targets of underage smoking by various
points in time - but those provisions,
by virtually all accounts, involve
penalties for failure to achieve the
relevant targets that are too weak.
Moreover, as we will show in the text
below, even if the penalties are increased,
the way in which the penalties would be
apportioned among tobacco companies
(essentially on a market-share basis)
would undermine each company's
incentives to reduce underage smoking.
To get a clearer picture of the limits of
the command-and-control and
performance-based regulations outlined
in the proposed resolution, consider the
following questions:
• What if the proposed cigarette
warnings and advertising restrictions are
ineffective, as they have been in the past?
• What if, in response to
requirements that they must tum over to
the FDA all research regarding potential
alternative, potentially safer, cigarette
designs, cigarette manufacturers stop
conducting such research?
e What if the FDA does identify a
cigarette design that appears likely to be
safer than conventional designs? Should
the FDA mandate it? What if smokers
increase their overall consumption of
cigarettes because of the new design?
What if the safer cigarette is unpopular
because of, say, unpleasant taste
attributes? Should the FDA require that
all cigarettes adopt the new design? If
not, will the FDA require that cigarette
manufacturers market cigarettes with the
safer design as aggressively as they
market their conventional brands?
• What about the look-back
provision? Why is the target reduction
level set at 60%? What if the look-back
provision is successful in encouraging the
industry to reduce underage smoking to
target levels, but many individuals who
do not begin as underage smokers
simply pick up the habit at age 18?

Incentive-based regulation would
significantly reduce the problems
suggested by the preceding set of
questions. It would do so by taking
government regulators out of the role of
trying to make complex economic and
scientific determinations and by relying
instead on the expertise ,of manufacturers
and on the power of market forces.
The proposed resolution arguably
includes an incentive-based component,
insofar as the costs imposed on
manufacturers are required to be passed
through to consumers in the form of a
price hike. That mandated price hike
would, like an excise tax, force
manufacturers to bear at least some of
the costs of their products. Viewing the
proposed regulation in that light, some
scholars have complained that the price
hike is too small. According to Jeffrey
Harris, for instance, the proposed
agreement would, if adopted, have the
effect of a $0.62 per pack excise tax on
cigarettes. In addition, some senators and
the Clinton administration have recently
suggested the possibility of increasing the
price hike to some amount closer to
$1.50 per pack. (See Jeffrey Taylor,
"More Senators Seem to Back Increasing
Cigarette Prices Beyond Level in Accord,"
Wall Street]oumal, A4, Sept. 17, 1997.)
There appears to be an emerging
consensus among commentators and
policy makers, in other words, that the
regulatory effect of the de facto excise tax
needs to be enhanced and will have a
greater regulatory effect than that of
other aspects of the proposed resolution.
With that conclusion we agree. An
excise tax probably does have certain
advantages over command-and-control
or performance-based regulation.
However, as an incentive-based system of
regulation an excise tax has distinct
disadvantages when compared with what
we refer to as "ex post incentive-based
regulation." By an ex post incentive-based

system we mean a regime in which each
cigarette manufacturer is forced to pay the
external costs caused by its brand of
cigarettes as those costs actually become
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manifest - that is, manufacturers pay
damages ex post.
An excise tax, which can be thought
of as an "ex ante incentive-based" regime,
has two important disadvantages when
compared with an ex post incentivebased regime. First, choosing the
appropriate rate of tax requires the
regulator (as in the case of commandand-control and performance-based
regulation) to have an enormous amount
of information up front (at the time the
tax rate is set) about the costs and
benefits of cigarettes, including the costs
and benefits of alternative cigarette
designs. In contrast, under an ex post
regime, costs would be imposed on
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cigarette manufacturers only as the
external harms caused by cigarettes
actually became manifest. Thus, although
the regulator would be responsible for
sorting out after the fact what harms had
been caused by cigarettes and should be
charged to manufacturers, it would be
the cigarette manufacturers who would
decide up front how to make and market
cigarettes to minimize those costs.
The second disadvantage of an excise
tax, compared with an ex post approach,
is that an excise tax does not create
incentives for cigarette manufacturers to

compete over safety. This is a very basic
point, but it is extremely important and
is central to our argument for an ex post
regime (and to our critique of the
proposed resolution). At best, an excise
tax (and the de facto excise tax
contemplated in the proposed resolution)
would impose on each manufacturer the
average per pack external costs for the
whole industry Such a tax, however,
provides no incentive for manufacturers
to make investments in developing and
manufacturing safer cigarette designs
(such as nicotine-free cigarettes or lowcarcinogen cigarettes) or in identifying
relatively low-risk smokers (people who
are least likely to suffer harmful effects

tax. Again, each manufacturer would
have a strong incentive to make no such
safety-enhancing investments. This
phenomenon is a special case of what
policy scholars call the "common pool"
or "free rider" problem. We sometimes
refer to it as the "unraveling problem,"
because, under such a scenario, the
market for safety improvements may
unravel, as each manufacturer realizes
that making investments in safety
enhancements is not in its financial best
interest.

D. The smokers' compensation
alternative

from smoking). Any such innovations
would cost a manufacturer money - the
research and development costs among
others - but would provide essentially
zero benefit to that manufacturer given
that the taxes are fixed (or, if variable, are
assessed on a market share basis).
If the taxes are fixed, then, of course,
nothing that a manufacturer does can
lower them. Even if the taxes vary to
reflect the changes in the average costs of
cigarettes, however, manufacturers will
not invest to lower those costs, because
the benefit of such investments would be
shared with the whole industry in the
form of a reduced industry-wide excise

An ex post incentive-based regime
can, at least in theory, overcome the
unraveling problem associated with an
excise tax and can thereby create the
market incentives for manufacturers to
compete over safety. Such an ex post
regime can force each manufacturer to
bear the harms caused by its brand of
cigarettes specifically and not just the
average harm caused by the industry as a
whole. To achieve that goal, one of the
essential elements of any ex post
incentive-based regime would be an
ability, even if imperfect, to trace harms
to specific brands.
The specific form of ex post incentivebased regulation that we will emphasize
here is a regime that we call "smokers'
compensation." One of many possible
versions of such a system would rely on
a newly created administrative board
with authority to adjudicate the
compensation claims. Someone suffering
from a smoking-related illness would
bring a claim to that board and present
evidence regarding his or her injury and
smoking history. If necessary causal links
were established, the board would award
compensation to the claimant and then
charge the manufacturer or
manufacturers for the amount paid out.
But, whatever form it might take, a
smokers' compensation system is
distinguishable from an excise tax in the
following ways:

• Fact finding with regard to harms
caused by cigarettes would be based on
evidence of actual harms after they have
occurred rather than on speculation
regarding possible future harms.
• Manufacturers, rather than
regulators, would conduct the ex ante
cost-benefit analysis regarding what
safety investments to make, what
product design changes to consider, and
how those changes will ,affect product
demand.
• Costs would be imposed on
manufacturers on a brand-specific, rather
than on a fixed, industry wide, or market
share basis.
• Incentives to compete over
increased safety would be created, rather
than dulled or eliminated.
• Victims of smoking-caused harm
themselves would voluntarily come
forward with information regarding
harms caused by cigarettes, thereby
providing useful information regarding
brand-specific risks.
The smokers' compensation system
can also be distinguished from products
liability law - another ex post incentivebased regime. Under the current rules,
products liability law is the only existing
ex post incentive-based regulation of
cigarettes. Some commentators complain,
however, that that regime has been
wholly ineffective, a complaint we
challenge below. Other commentators
and industry officials may worry that
products liability law, in its current form,
presents the tobacco industry with an
unacceptable level of uncertainty as to
what the industrys overall liability for
smoking-caused harm will be. It is also
sometimes argued that the tort system
entails relatively high administrative costs
compared to other systems of deterrence.
In response to such concerns, consider
the following ways in which the
proposed smokers' compensation model
might be cheaper, simpler, and more
certain than its tort law alternative:
• The fact finding determination
would be conducted by an administrative
board or an administrative law judge
rather than by a lay jury.
• This fact finder could be specially
trained in dealing with scientific
evidence, or could be authorized to
solicit advice from experts or a blueribbon panel of scientists.
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• The damages for each type of
smoking-caused harm could be predetermined based on some type of grid
system, whereby a given harm produces
a given (i.e., certain) level of damage
payment from the manufacturer.
• The only fact finding question
would be causation. Hence there would
be no need for expensive fact finding on
such questions as product defect,
industry standards, assumption of risk,
and the like.
• Although the need for litigation in
hard cases would not be eliminated, the
claims adjustment process could become
more routinized than is the case with
current product liability claims, thereby
reducing administrative costs.
If the above-listed aspects of the
proposal do not provide enough
certainty, it might be possible to impose
an overall cap or budget on the amount
of damages that can be paid by the
cigarette industry in a given year, so long

as the damage payments within that cap are
allocated among manufacturers according to
each company~ relative causal share of the
harm, and not just according to market share.
This has been a necessarily sketchy
outline of a smokers' compensation
approach to regulating cigarettes. We
have made no effort here to work out all
the details of such a program, nor do we
expect that that task will prove easy.
Still, there are a variety of ways in which
such a regulatory regime might be
adjusted or tailored without eliminating
its beneficial effects. We would note,
moreover, that there are existing
regulatory regimes to which policy
makers may usefully look for guidance
regarding how to implement a smokers'
compensation regime. The most obvious
analogy, given the name we have chosen,
is workers' compensation. Another
analogy would be no-fault automobile
insurance. The smokers' compensation
regime that we have in mind, after all, is
essentially a no-fault system with the
cigarette companies acting as the insurers
of smoking-caused harms.
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There are two possible objections to an
ex post incentive-based system, such as a
smokers' compensation system, as
compared to an ex ante incentive-based
system of regulation, such as an excise tax.

A. Strategic avoidance
of regulatory incentives
First, an excise tax might be presumed
superior because it would be charged as
the cigarette is sold rather than when the
injury occurs. Because, under a smokers'
compensation system, manufacturers
would be liable for the harms of
cigarettes sold many years earlier, a
smokers' compensation system would
arguably create opportunities for cigarette
manufacturers to evade the regulator's
incentive-creating sanctions. For
example, after profiting for twenty years
or so, a new entrant to the cigarette
market might simply distribute its assets
to its shareholders, rendering itself
largely immune to the threat of smokers'
compensation claims. To be sure, the
manufacturer would then be bankrupted
by the smokers' compensation claims,
but only after many years of profiting
substantially and distributing those
profits to shareholders. Legal scholars
sometimes describe this as a 'Judgmentproofing" or "hit and run" strategy.
There are several reasons why such
judgment-proofing strategies are unlikely
to be adopted by manufacturers. For
example, sophisticated long-term
creditors would - and, in other
industries, do - include covenants
prohibiting (or, more generally, increasing
the costliness o0 such strategies. Also,
opportunities for strategic avoidance of
regulatory incentives exist for virtually all
forms of regulation. For instance,
manufacturers could avoid the effect of
an excise tax by directly or indirectly
selling their brands on black markets, as
may be common in other countries that

e

have substantial cigarette tariffs. That
evasion strategy would be less effective
under a smokers' compensation system
because manufacturers would have to
pay for the harms caused by all of their
cigarettes, even those purchased on black
markets. Indeed, for that reason,
manufacturers would have a strong
incentive to discourage the emergence of
black markets in their own cigarettes.
Finally, there are regulatory policies that
could be adopted that would prevent
manufacturers from evading the threat of
future liability. For instance, as is
provided for under the proposed
resolution, manufacturers might be
required to put up a substantial bond, to
ensure that some assets are available in
the future. Similarly, as is the case for
virtually all European corporations,
manufacturers might be required to meet
minimum capitalization requirements,
which would serve the same purpose as
a bond. Finally, as is true of automobile
drivers in most of the states in this
country, cigarette manufacturers could be
required to purchase a minimum amount
of liability insurance which would cover
the costs of future potential liability.

B. The personal responsibility
question
Others might object to a smokers'
compensation system (or to any other
type of victim-initiated ex post incentivebased system) on the ground that it
compensates smokers for the harms
caused by cigarettes and thus removes
from them any responsibility for their
own decisions. The goal of a smokers'
compensation system is to enhance

public health. But if the goal were to
force individuals to own up to, or take
responsibility for, their actions, we are
aware of no policy response that would
be superior to a smokers' compensation
system. Thats true for several reasons.
For starters, smokers would have to
pay when purchasing each pack of
cigarettes, in the form of higher product
prices, for their right to make a claim
later, when a smoking-caused illness
occurs. The arrangement is no different
from that between insureds and their
first-party insurers. Thus, smokers would
not be getting something for nothing and
would not be evading responsibility.
Indeed, the whole goal of this type of
incentive-based system is not to let
smokers off the hook but to force
smokers to take responsibility by forcing
each smoker to place his money where
his mouth is. Absent such a price
increase, smokers would continue to
disregard the substantial costs that their
smoking poses to themselves and to
others; and smokers would continue to
have to "take responsibility" for risks that
they were not fully aware of. Moreover,
the harms caused by cigarettes are, of
course, often quite serious. And even to
the extent smokers or their families
receive compensation for some of the
costs of cigarette-caused harms, it is
difficult to say that the dead or seriously
ill smoker ever fully evades the ultimate
responsibility for her smoking decisions.
Finally, of course, smokers are not the
only actors who should be accountable
for their actions. Under an ex post
incentive-based regime, tobacco
manufacturers, too, would be forced to
bear responsibility for their actions.
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Those who are interested in the
cigarette problem might ask questions
such as: "Doesn't the proposed resolution
represent a step in the right direction?";
and "In light of the fact that the apparent
momentum in Washington to enact a
comprehensive federal regulatory
response to the cigarette problem might
die, shouldn't we embrace the proposed
resolution or something substantially
similar to it while we have the chance,
rather than be returned to the status
quo?"
In our view, the answer to both
questions is "no." Taking public health as
the overriding goal, we would, if forced
to choose, pick the status quo. To
understand why, it is necessary first to
understand that critics and supporters of
the proposed settlement share two flawed
premises, which nevertheless seem to be
dictating the terms of the policy debate.
First, both sides assume that the primary
purpose of products liability law in this
context is, not to serve public health
goals, but simply to compensate those
injured by smoking. Second, both sides
seem to agree that civil liability laws
have, to date, failed to serve that or any
other worthwhile goal. Consequently,
most participants in the debate have
indicated in one way or another that the
elimination of tort law would be no big
loss, even for smoking plaintiffs. The
proponents of the proposed resolution,
for instance, point out that, even if
$368.5 billion does not cover all the
harms, past and future, caused by
cigarettes, it is a lot more than nothing,

which is what manufacturers have paid
in tort damages to date. Critics of the
proposed resolution are typically less
explicit. They make their views known
either by not mentioning the effect of the
proposed resolution on tort law or by
indicating that they would not challenge
that effect if only the proposed resolution
could be adjusted to better serve public
health goals.
Arguably, however, the principal goal
of products liability law is, broadly
speaking, public health, not compensation.
In the cigarette context in particular, the
question then becomes whether the
public-health goal is better achieved
through products liability law or through
the types of regulation envisaged in the
proposed resolution. Those who would
sacrifice products liability law to accept
the proposed resolution implicitly
assume that the public health benefits of
the latter would outpace the public
health benefits of the former. But,
perhaps because of the general anti-tort
sentiment in this country, that
presumption has been largely
unexamined and is, for several reasons,
highly questionable.
First, products liability law comes far
closer, at least in theory, to providing an
ex post incentive-based type of
regulation than any alternative form of
regulation now being considered (other
than the smokers' compensation regime
we are proposing). Moreover, products
liability law could have more than just a
theoretical impact. It is true that no
substantial product liability judgments
have been won against the tobacco
industry. Nevertheless, products liability
law is currently in a state of flux or
disequilibrium; and the growing
likelihood of many large civil judgments
against the industry is a big part of what
pushed the industry to the negotiating
table and thus what made the $368.5
billion settlement offer possible. In other
words, to say that the settlement
agreement would produce $368.5 billion

while product liability law has produced
nothing is to misunderstand what
motivated the agreement in the first
place.
It would be more accurate to claim
that administrative regulation, not tort
law, has failed those who have been
harmed by cigarette smoking. The FDA
has long declined to exercise its authority
in this area, presumably because of the
political power of the cigarette industry
and because of the FDA's lack of
expertise regarding how best to regulate.
Furthermore, it has been administrative
regulation that has effectively derailed
otherwise viable products liability claims
against cigarette manufacturers. For
example, the FTC-promulgated warning
labels have given rise to the preemption
defense and greatly strengthened the
assumption-of-risk defense in tort law.
Those defenses have until very recently
proved an insurmountable barrier to tort
recovery. Thus, in light of this past
experience with administrative
regulation, it is not clear that we should
have much confidence in the expanded
role for administrative regulation
contemplated in the proposed resolution.
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PLACING

PROPOSED
RESOLUTION
IN CONTEXT
That brings us to our final
observation. The history of tobacco
regulation makes clear one very
disturbing fact. The cigarette industry
has, using a variety of strategies,
successfully managed to protect itself
throughout this century against any form
of meaningful regulation. By far, its most
successful str;:i.tegy has been to meet the
threat of tough regulations with
preemptive, command-and-control-style,
anemic regulations. The experience with
FTC warning requirements is a case in
point. But there are many others. Within
the last several years, that practice has
been especially evident at the local level,
where the industry has supported some
state tobacco control legislation in an
effort to preempt the authority of city,
town, and county governments to
control the sale and use of tobacco. With
that historical backdrop in place, it is
illuminating to look briefly again at the
promises and the likely effects of the
proposed resolution. As will become
clear, the proposed resolution appears to
be just one more example - this time
on a grander scale - of a very successful
long-term tobacco-industry strategy.

The proposed resolution states that
"[a] key element in achieving the Act's
goals will be forcing a fundamental
change in the way the tobacco industry
does business." With that assessment we
completely agree. The proposed
resolution also claims that it would
"provide for means to ensure that the
industry will not only comply with the
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letter of the law but will also have
powerful incentives to prevent underage
usage of tobacco products and to strive
to develop and market less hazardous
tobacco products." As our analysis has
indicated, however, that claim is
unfounded.
Indeed, as already emphasized, the
mix of regulatory regimes chosen by the
proposed resolution - mostly
command-and-control; some qualified
performance-based; and virtually zero ex
post incentive-based regulation - is
precisely the reverse of what most policyoriented scholarship would recommend.
Moreover, it is, from the tobacco
industrys perspective, ideal. In light of
the industrys track record, therefore, the
choice of that mix of regulatory regimes
was probably no accident.
As noted above, command-andcontrol is the least effective form of
regulation in this type of setting. It
requires the regulator to have an
enormous amount of information about
the product, information that the
regulator often must rely on the industry
to provide. Insofar as the industry is the
source of the regulators information, it
becomes relatively easy for the industry
to manipulate the process and avoid
really having to bear the costs of its
actions. Furthermore, the regulations
themselves are severely limited by the
inability of the regulator to anticipate
every counter-move that the industry
might make in its attempt to thwart the
regulator - or, more accurately, to save
the money that would otherwise have to
be spent in complying with the spirit of
the regulation. As we have argued, those
criticisms certainly apply to the
settlements numerous command-andcontrol regulations. To be sure, the
agreement also contains some elements
of performance-based regulations, which,
in theory, might pose somewhat of a
regulatory threat to the cigarette industry.
As other critics have noted and our
research shows, however, the
performance-based aspects of the
settlement are rendered quite anemic by
the substantial ex ante and ex post
loopholes and the relatively minor
surcharges for failing to meet
performance targets.
Considering the big picture, therefore,
we have no trouble rejecting the
suggestion that the proposed settlement

would somehow substantially alter the
culture or incentives of the tobacco
industry. To the contrary, the basic
incentives of manufacturers would
remain. They would still seek to find and
to create loopholes in the regulations.
They would still seek to misrepresent the
risks to consumers and regulators.
Our very strong sense at the end of
the day is that the proposed resolution
would accomplish precisely what
previous efforts to regulate the cigarette
industry have accomplished. Specifically,
the proposal would create the illusion of
regulation (at least initially) while
simultaneously protecting the industry
and smokers from having to bear the
costs of cigarettes.
Based on our analysis, we would
recommend that Congress reject the
proposed resolution and start over from
scratch, this time beginning with the
following question in mind: How can we
design an effective ex post incentivebased response to the cigarette problem?
In our forthcoming Yale Law Journal
article (cited above), we discuss the
framework for beginning that analysis,
although much work on the details
remains to be done
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